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CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-HIGHWAY AGRICUL-
TURAL INSPECTIONS AND FLA. STAT. § 570.15: AN ATTEMPT TO EVADE
THE REASONABLENESS AND PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARDS OF THE
FOURTH AMENDmENT--Pederson v. State, 373 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
Late on the evening of December 17, 1977, Marvin J. Pederson
violated Florida law when he failed to stop at the agriculture in-
spection station located on 1-75.1 Acting pursuant to the Depart-
ment of Agriculture Road Guard Manual,2 Inspector Leonard
Pease followed the Pederson truck in a state pursuit vehicle and
pulled him over to the side of the highway. Pease requested per-
mission to inspect the contents of Pederson's truck for agricultural
products, but the driver refused.3 Subsequently, Pederson was
escorted back to the inspection station where Pease formally ar-
rested him for violating section 570.15(2), Florida Statutes. 4 Peder-
1. Pederson v. State, 373 So. 2d 367, 368 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, No.
57,599 (Fla. Mar. 18, 1980). Ch. 75-215, § 1, 1975 Fla. Laws 493 (current version at FLA.
STAT. § 570.15(2) (1979), as amended by ch. 79-587, 1979 Fla. Seas. Law Serv. 2608 (West))
states: "It shall be unlawful for any truck or motor vehicle trailer to pass any official road
guard inspection station without first stopping for inspection. A violation of this subsection
shall constitute a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or
s. 775.083."
2. The Road Guard Bureau of the Division of Inspection is administered by the Depart-
ment of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department of Agriculture). The Department's
unpublished and undated Road Guard Manual specifies two conflicting procedures for in-
spectors to follow when a vehicle which is statutorily required to stop at an inspection sta-
tion fails to do so. The inspector is directed to follow the vehicle in an official pursuit car at
a speed necessary to overtake it. After the pursued vehicle is stopped, the inspector must
identify himself, ask for the driver's license, and ask permission to look inside. If permission
is refused, the inspector requests the driver to return with him to the station. If the driver
refuses and proceeds on, the inspector is directed to call the Florida Highway Patrol or the
local sheriff's department for assistance.
However, a second, and presumably later, procedure directs the inspector to apprehend
and arrest any driver who refuses to submit to an inspection at the station. The inspector is
required to request assistance "if needed." (emphasis in original). Department of Agricul-
ture Manual, Division of Inspection, Inspection and Enforcement Procedures (located in
Room 323, Mayo Building, Tallahassee, Fla.).
3. Pederson v. State, 373 So. 2d 367, 368 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979). Under ch. 75-215,
§ 1, 1975 Fla. Laws 493 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 570.15(1)(a) (1979), as amended by
ch. 79-587, § 1, 1979 Fla. Seas. Law Serv. 2608 (West)), Department of Agriculture inspec-
tors have "full access at all reasonable hours" to trucks "used in the production, manufac-
ture, storage, sales, or transportation within the state" of agricultural, horticultural, and
livestock products.
4. Ch. 750-215, 1975 Fla. Laws 493 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 570.15 (1979), as
amended by ch. 79-587, 1979 Fla. Seas. Law Serv. 2608 (West)).
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son again refused to permit an examination of the cargo area of his
truck.5 He was thereupon detained for "two or three hours" until
the inspector had secured a search warrant, which authorized a
search "for agricultural products kept in violation of Chapter 570
and the laws pertaining to the transportation of agricultural prod-
ucts."6 Upon inspection of Pederson's truck, Pease discovered ma-
rijuana. Based on that evidence, Pederson was convicted in Hamil-
ton County Circuit Court for possession of marijuana.'
Since 1975, section 570.15(1), Florida Statutes, has authorized
Department of Agriculture highway inspectors to conduct searches
of certain vehicles "used in the production, manufacture, storage,
sale, or transportation within the state of any food product; any
agricultural, horticultural, or livestock product; or any article or
product kith respect to which any authority is conferred by law on
the department."8 If a driver refused permission for the search, the
inspector was statutorily empowered to either obtain a search war-
rant or "conduct a search . . . without a warrant pursuant to s.
933.19."' Section 933.19, Florida Statutes, 0 incorporates into state
5. Pederson v. State, 373 So. 2d 367, 368 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
6. Id. at 368-69. Ch. 75-215, § 1, 1975 Fla. Laws 493 (current version at FLA. STAT. §
570.15(1)(b) (1979), as amended by ch. 79-587, 1979 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 2608 (West)), per-
mitted an inspector to "apply for a search warrant which shall be obtained as provided by
law for the obtaining of search warrants in other cases, or may conduct a search of any of
the aforesaid vehicles without a warrant pursuant to s. 933.19."
Ch. 77-174, § 1, 1977 Fla. Laws 719 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 933.02 (1979)), pro-
vides in part for the issuance of search warrants "lu]pon proper affidavits" which establish
that one of the following grounds exists:
(1) When the property shall have been stolen or embezzled in violation of law;
(2) When any property shall have been used:
(a) As a means to commit any crime,
(b) In connection with gambling, gambling implements and appliances, or
(c) In violation of s. 847.011 or other laws in reference to obscene prints and
literature;
(3) When any property constitutes evidence relevant to proving that a felony has
been committed;
(4) When any property is being held or possessed:
(a) In violation of any of the laws prohibiting the manufacture, sale, and transpor-
tation of intoxicating liquors, or
(b) In violation of the fish and game laws, or
(c) In violation of the laws relative to food and drug.
Id.
7. Pederson v. State, 373 So. 2d 367, 367-68 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
8. Ch. 75-215, § 1, 1975 Fla. Laws 493 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 570.15 (1979), as
amended by ch. 79-587, 1979 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 2608 (West)).
9. Id. Prior to 1975, ch. 59-54, § 1, 1959 Fla. Laws 74 (current version at FLA. STAT. §
570.15 (1979), as amended by ch. 79-587, 1979 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 2608 (West)), authorized
certain employees of the Department of Agriculture to "have full access at all reasonable
hours to all places of business, factories, farm buildings, carriages, railroad cars, motor vehi-
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search and seizure law the holding of the United States Supreme
Court in Carroll v. United States.1 In Carroll, the Court held that
the warrantless search of an automobile does not violate the fourth
amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches if certain
conditions are present: The officer must have probable cause to be-
lieve that the vehicle contains contraband or other evidence of
criminal activity;' and the circumstances must be such that the
officer is required to act quickly before the automobile can be re-
moved, the evidence can be destroyed, or the suspect can escape.' 8
In Pederson v. State, 4 Inspector Pease had obtained a warrant.
The defendant challenged the validity of that warrant when he ap-
pealed his conviction to the First District Court of Appeal.15 Under
section 933.02, which is incorporated by reference into section
570.15(1)(b), Florida Statutes, a warrant will not be issued by a
judge or magistrate unless a proper affidavit establishes probable
cause to believe that the premises or vehicle to be searched con-
tains the evidence or items which the officer suspects it contains.' 6
Inspector Pease, statutorily authorized to search only for "agri-
cles and vessels" used in the agriculture industry. It also authorized an inspector to "apply
for a search warrant which shall be obtained as provided by law. . . in other cases" if access
was refused by the "owner, agent or manager of such premises."
Chapter 75-215, § 1, 1975 Fla. Laws 493 amended section 570.15 to include "inspectors"
and "road guard inspection special officers" within the employees already authorized to in-
spect the premises listed and, additionally, authorized full access to "trucks, motor vehicles
other than private passenger automobiles with no trailer in tow or any vehicles bearing an
RV license tag, truck and motor vehicle trailers." It further authorized agricultural inspec-
tors and other named employees to "conduct a search of any of the aforesaid vehicles with-
out a warrant pursuant to s. 933.19." The statute continued to provide for the application of
a search warrant in accordance with Florida Statutes. But see ch. 78-180, 1978 Fla. Laws 580
(current version at FLA. STAT. § 570.15(1) (1979), as amended by ch. 79-587, 1979 Fla. Sess.
Law Serv. 2608 (West)) (exemption for vehicles bearing RV license tags deleted). See also
Miller v. State, 368 So. 2d 943, 944 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
10. (1979).
11. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
12. Id. at 156.
13. Id. at 153. Carroll established the exigent circumstance that, when automobiles are
mobile and can be removed before an officer has an opportunity to secure a search warrant,
a warrant may not be required to conduct a valid search in the proper circumstances. Id.
Later case law established the additional exigent circumstances of preventing the destruc-
tion of evidence and of preventing the suspect's escape. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42,
51 (1970).
For an in-depth discussion of the evolution of exigent circumstances relating to searches
and seizures, see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-73 (1971).
14. 373 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
15. Id. at 367.
16. See note 6 supra.
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cultural, horticultural, or livestock products, '11 7 failed to establish
in his affidavit sufficient probable cause to believe that Pederson's
truck was transporting such products. 18 The result of the First Dis-
trict Court of Appeal's ruling was that the marijuana discovered
during the illegal search of the truck could not be used as evidence
against Pederson in a criminal prosecution.18 The court reversed
his conviction and, in doing so, also rejected the state's argument
that agricultural inspections require less stringent constitutional
safeguards than the fourth amendment mandates for criminal
searches. 20 The court stated, "We think it obvious here that the
inspector had no probable cause to believe that Pederson's particu-
lar vehicle was carrying contraband or agricultural products. 2 1 It
cited Carroll v. United States, and the adoption of that opinion as
the law of Florida under section 933.19, Florida Statutes, as au-
thority: "Carroll stated that warrantless searches of vehicles could
be justified only where there was probable cause for believing that
the vehicle was carrying contraband or illegal merchandise. ' 22 The
Pederson court did not elaborate further on the basis for its deci-
sion to exclude as evidence against Pederson the marijuana seized
by Inspector Pease. The court's finding of inadmissibility was obvi-
ously based on the exclusionary rule, a judicially-created means of
enforcing the fourth amendment's constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures.23 In response to Pederson, the
17. See note 3 supra.
18. 373 So. 2d at 369. See also FLA. STAT. § 933.04 (1979), which is incorporated indi-
rectly by reference in FLA. STAT. § 570.15(1)(b) (1979), and states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable seizures and searches shall not be violated and no search
warrant shall be issued except upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirma-
tion particularly describing the place to be searched and the person and thing to
be seized.
19. 373 So. 2d at 369.
20. Id. The state cited Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), as authority. In
Camara, the United States Supreme Court approved the use of a lesser probable cause stan-
dard for public health and safety officials seeking access to private dwellings. But the Peder-
son court refused to apply Camara saying: "Nowhere does Chapter 570, 933, or any other
statutory provision require that the administrative probable cause standard in Camara ap-
ply to agricultural inspections." 373 So. 2d at 369. See also Haugland v. State, 374 So. 2d
1026, 1031 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (burglary tools discovered during warrantless search
of luggage in trunk of car inadmissible) in which the court said: "This was plainly a criminal
search and seizure for . . . evidence of crime and cannot be converted into an administra-
tive-type inventory search of an automobile." (citation omitted).
21. 373 So. 2d at 369.
22. Id.
23. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. Rv. 349, 360
(1974).
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Florida Legislature statutorily granted agricultural inspectors
broader discretion to stop certain vehicles and to conduct searches.
This note will examine that revised statute and explore its consti-
tutional implications. It will attempt to demonstrate that the Flor-
ida law relating to highway agricultural inspections violates the
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. Further-
more, the legislative authorization of unconstitutional searches and
seizures cannot prevent Florida courts from applying the exclu-
sionary rule in future cases similar to Pederson.
Under the exclusionary rule, the fruit of an unconstitutional
search or seizure may not be used as evidence against the person
whose right to freedom from governmental intrusion has been vio-
lated."' The exclusionary rule has emerged from a patchwork of
Supreme Court cases construing the scope of the fourth amend-
ment and is one of the more confusing doctrines of the complex
law of searches and seizures."
24. In Weeks v. United States, the Court said:
If letters and private documents can.. . be seized and held and used in evidence
against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment
declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value,
and. . . might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts
and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are
not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of
endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamen-
tal law of the land.
232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
25. The fourth amendment states that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The exclusionary rule was first set out by the Court in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383 (1914), and was applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment in Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
The Supreme Court has developed the following exceptions to the fourth amendment re-
quirement that a warrant based on probable cause be obtained prior to seizing evidence for
use in criminal prosecutions: (1) when officers are in "hot pursuit" of a suspect, Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); (2) when evidence is "in plain view" and is inadvertently seen
by an officer who has a legal right to be in that place, Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234
(1968); (3) when a suspect is stopped and frisked for probable cause, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1968); (4) when a search is conducted incident to a lawful arrest, Sibron v. New York, 392
U.S. 40 (1968); (5) when exigent circumstances exist-such as the possibility that the evi-
dence will be removed before a warrant can be obtained-so long as probable cause exists,
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); (6) when consent is voluntarily and know-
ingly given without coercion, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); (7) when an
inventory search is conducted in accord with routine police procedures, South Dakota v.
1980]
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Much of the confusion which has sprung from the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the fourth amendment can be traced to
the conflict which surrounds its purpose. Courts and commentators
alike have struggled to strike a proper balance between the amend-
ment's goal of protecting an individual's privacy and its goal of
regulating police conduct." On its face, the amendment contains
both a guarantee and a prohibition. The reasonableness clause
guarantees individuals "[tihe right . . . to be secure . . .against
unreasonable searches and seizures." The warrant clause prohibits
government officials from obtaining warrants to search or seize in-
dividuals or their "houses, papers, and effects" unless certain con-
ditions are first met.27 The official must have "probable cause"; i.e.,
sufficient reason to believe that the evidence of unlawfulness which
he or she seeks by the search or seizure is likely to be found .' The
official must also subscribe to an oath or affirmation that such
probable cause exists and must substantiate that affidavit by "par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized."'
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); (8) when evidence is discovered inadvertently by an officer
who is lawfully in the place of discovery, so long as time and circumstances are sufficient to
dissipate the connection between the discovery and the introduction of the evidence in a
criminal proceeding, United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
Certain exceptions to the exclusionary rule have also evolved through case law. It is not
applicable to evidence arising from grand jury testimony concerning a third party, United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); or business records, Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S.
463 (1976).
The fourth amendment's guarantee has been extended to the states through Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). For a succinct and helpful outline of the current status of fourth
amendment law, see Bloodworth, Where Search and Seizure Is Today, 39 ALA. LAw. 444
(1978).
26. The Court recognized the conflict between the two goals of the fourth amendment in
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States: "The needs of law enforcement stand in constant ten-
sion with the Constitution's protections of the individual against certain exercises of official
power. It is precisely the predictability of these pressures that counsels a resolute loyalty to
constitutional safeguards." 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973).
Professor Anthony Amsterdam, a noted fourth amendment scholar, has stated the ques-
tion as "whether the amendment should be viewed as protecting specific interests of specific
individuals against specific abuses of specific police procedures or as regulating police prac-
tices broadly, generally and directly." Amsterdam, supra note 23, at 372.
27. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. See note 25 supra.
28. In Carroll v. United States, the Court defined probable cause as "facts and circum-
stances.. . such as to warrant a man of reasonable prudence and caution in believing that
the offense has been committed." 267 U.S. at 161.
29. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. See note 25 supra. "The requirement of particularity of
description of things is important to note, for it shows that even when there is sufficient
cause to intrude upon an individual by a search, the framers decreed that it was unreasona-
ble and should be unconstitutional to subject his premises or possessions to indiscriminate
seizure." Amsterdam, supra note 23, at 411.
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The two-clause structure of the amendment, which reflects its
dual purpose, has led to overlapping and sometimes conflicting
analyses by the Court in its review of challenged searches and
seizures.30 The initial analytical inquiries, however, have remained
the same. Does the challenged action constitute a "search" or
"seizure"; and, if so, is the search or seizure reasonable? In deter-
mining what constitutes reasonableness, the Court's analyses have
relied increasingly upon the requirements of the warrant clause.3
Thus, the guarantee against unreasonable intrusions has become
indistinguishable in some cases from the prohibition against abu-
sive police conduct. This merger view of the reasonableness and
warrant clauses was set forth in Chambers v. Maroney: "In enforc-
ing the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures, the Court has insisted upon probable cause
as a minimum requirement for a reasonable search permitted by
the Constitution. '3 2
The First District Court of Appeal's decision in Pederson thus
rested squarely on the Supreme Court's present construction of the
fourth amendment. The Florida court held Inspector Pease's
search of Pederson's truck to be unreasonable because the inspec-
tor had no probable cause to believe the vehicle contained contra-
band or agricultural products."
Despite the fact that the Pederson opinion was based on settled
principles of constitutional law, it initiated a chain of events which
resulted in a substantial 1979 revision of the Florida statute au-
thorizing Department of Agriculture employees to conduct high-
way inspections. When the Pederson court refused to approve a
less stringent standard of probable cause for the issuance of agri-
30. As an example of the Court's inconsistency in analyzing search and seizure chal-
lenges, the focus of its approach shifted from the protection of places to the protection of
people in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). At least one commentator views the
Court's recent decision in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), as a return to predicating
fourth amendment rights against unreasonable intrusions on property rights rather than on
a personal right to privacy. See Allen & Schaefer, Great Expectations: Privacy Rights in
Automobiles, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 99, 109-13 (1979). Yet, in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648 (1979), the Court said: "The essential purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth
Amendment is to impose a standard of 'reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion by
government officials, including law enforcement agents, in order "'to safeguard the privacy
and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions .... ' "...Id. at 653-54 (quoting
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967))) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
31. See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972).
32. 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) (emphasis added).
33. 373 So. la at 369.
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cultural search warrants, it stated that "it may be constitutionally
permissible for the Legislature to impose an administrative proba-
ble cause standard."3 4 Two months after the Pederson decision was
announced, Commissioner of Agriculture Doyle Conner wrote a let-
ter to Governor Bob Graham, urging him to support "some ur-
gently required amendments to our road guard law" for considera-
tion during the special session of the legislature scheduled for
November, 1979. 35 Conner stated that the Pederson decision
presented "an impossible situation" because it "holds, in effect,
that if inspection of vehicles required to stop at our road guard
inspection stations is refused, a search warrant must be obtained,
and only on a showing that probable cause exists for our inspectors
to believe that the law is being violated." 6 Conner went on to ex-
plain that the Department of Agriculture would propose a bill to
the legislature "which would not require probable cause, in the
34. Id. In a footnote, the court added: "We do not express an opinion as to the propriety
of warrantless inspection searches, but there is authority for such a procedure pursuant to
proper legislative authority." Id. at 369 n.2 (citations omitted). For authority the court cited
State v. Bailey, 586 P.2d 648 (Ariz. App. 1978), and Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663
n.26 (1979).
Bailey is easily distinguished from the Florida agriculture inspection situation. The Ari-
zona court in that case affirmed the propriety of seizing marijuana uncovered during a war-
rantless vehicle search on the basis of an Arizona statute and a state regulation "directed at
vehicles from states east of the Rocky Mountains, which had been designated a 'high pest-
risk area.' The [Clommission [of Agriculture and Horticulture] is empowered to make and
enforce such regulations as are necessary 'to prevent introduction of a crop pest or disease
into the state.'" 586 P.2d at 650 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The Arizona court
adopted the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals which considered a similar fact
situation involving the state of Hawaii:
([Qiuarantined fruits, vegetables, and plants) can easily be transported. . . to the
continental United States by departing tourists. The effect of such movement on
agricultural crops in the mainland states could be serious, as each of the quaran-
tined items may carry some form of plant disease or insect which could destroy
crops in the other areas . . . .[R]equiring warrants for agricultural inspections of
this type would effectively cripple any meaningful quarantine.
Id. at 650 (quoting United States v. Schafer, 461 F.2d 856, 858 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 881 (1972)).
Florida's agricultural inspection program is designed to monitor product quality rather
than to implement quarantines. Delaware v. Prouse merely affirms the permissibility of
"roadside truck weigh-stations and inspection checkpoints, at which some vehicles may be
subject to further detention for safety and regulatory inspection than are others." 440 U.S.
at 663 n.26. The footnote clarifies a passage in the text of the Prouse opinion which states:
"This holding does not preclude the State of Delaware or other States from developing
methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained
exercise of discretion." Id. at 663 (emphasis added).
35. Letter from Doyle Conner to Bob Graham (August 24, 1979) (located in Office of the
Governor, the Capitol, Tallahassee, Fla.).
36. Id.
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criminal sense. It would rather impose a type of administrative
probable cause set out in a line of recent United States Supreme
Court cases. 3
7
On October 11, Attorney General Jim Smith joined Conner in
expressing his concern about the restrictive impact of Pederson
upon the authority of agricultural inspectors "to regulate the flow
of food, agricultural products, etc.," in accordance with chapter
570. "[I]f an individual drives a truck the contents of which are
sealed from plain view and refuses access to an inspector it will
necessarily follow that said inspector will be unable to inspect said
vehicle because he will not be able to establish the requisite prob-
able cause to inspect said vehicle as defined . . . in Pederson.""
The Attorney General concluded, "IT]he decision . .. has ren-
dered Section 570.15(1)(b) without force and effect."8 9
Neither letter described the "impossible situation" which war-
ranted granting broader search powers to agricultural inspectors.
The letters also failed to mention the fact that the Pederson deci-
sion dealt with the seizure of marijuana, possession of which is a
second degree felony.'0
The Department of Agriculture's proposed revision of section
570.15 was submitted to the legislature in November, 1979, as
House Bill 35-C. It engendered little controversy, passed quickly,
and was signed into law by Governor Graham on December 13,
1979.41 Apparently, neither the Governor nor the legislature ques-
tioned whether the urgency with which the Department sought
passage of the bill actually arose from unsuccessful attempts by
inspectors to check truckloads of fruits and vegetables, or from a
perceived need to strengthen the inspectors' statutory authority to
stop and search marijuana smugglers. It is unlikely, however, that
those state officials were unaware of the increased number of en-
counters between road guard inspectors and drug runners along
Florida highways.' 2
37. Id.
38. Letter from Jim Smith to Bob Graham (October 11, 1979) (located in Office of the
Governor, the Capitol, Tallahassee, Fla.).
39. Id. (citation omitted).
40. FLA. STAT. § 893.13(1)(d)1 (1979); a second degree felony is punishable by imprison-
ment not to exceed fifteen years and a $10,000 fine. FLA. STAT. § 775.082(3)(c), .083(1)(b)
(1979).
41. Ch. 79-587, 1979 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 2608 (West).
42. Florida became a major entry point for marijuana in the late 1970's when Colombia
assumed increased prominence as a major cannabis exporter. In 1975, Mexico supplied the
United States with 70% of its marijuana. In the wake of an American-financed crop eradica-
1980]
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As it now reads, section 570.1548 allows agricultural inspectors
substantial latitude in deciding which vehicles may be stopped,"
and it statutorily requires the driver of any detained vehicle to
submit to a search. 46 In addition, the law explicitly exempts agri-
cultural inspections from the search warrant prerequisites estab-
lished by chapter 933, Florida Statutes."" Section 570.15(1)(b) now
provides that an agricultural inspector or agent "may apply for,
obtain and execute" a search warrant so long as: (1) he has reason
to believe that the vehicle is subject to inspection under section
570.15(1)(a); (2) the vehicle has had reasonable notice to stop for
inspection; and (3) the driver or owner has refused access for regu-
latory inspection.47
Florida's attempts to oversee the quality of its agricultural prod-
ucts began in 1900 with the creation of the Division of Fruit and
Vegetable Inspection" for the sole purpose of measuring the ma-
turity of oranges. In 1934, the Department of Agriculture estab-
lished six inspection stations "to help prevent the shipment of
uninspected fruit beyond the Suwannee and St. Mary's Rivers. ''49
tion program, however, Mexican contraband, which was smuggled into the United States via
California and Texas, fell to less than one-third of the marijuana smoked by Americans. See
R. SCHROEDER, THE POLITICS OF DRUGS, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (2d ed. 1980). [hereinafter
cited as THE POLITICS OF DRUGS]:
Colombia moved quickly to fill the gap. The Guajira peninsula was already the
center of the flourishing cocaine trade. Smuggling routes were in place and exper-
ienced manpower was available .... By the end of the decade, an estimated
85,000 acres were planted to marijuana, producing some 35,000 tons of the drug
yearly.
Id. at 123-24 (footnote omitted).
Florida, with its proximity to South America and its extensive coastline, thus became the
natural port of entry for Colombian cannabis.
43. Due to the time at which the special session was held (November 1979), and due to
the fact that the biennial printing of Florida Statutes 1979 had already taken place, this
amended version of § 570.15 does not appear in Florida Statutes or in Laws of Florida 1979,
but in 1979 Fla. Seass. Law Serv. 2608 (West).
44. Formerly, the statute included certain vehicles "used in" the agriculture industry.
FLA. STAT. § 570.15(1)(a) (1979). The section now reads: "which are used or are of a type
which could be used." Ch. 79-587, 1979 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 2608 (West) (emphasis added).
45. FLA. STAT. § 570.15(2) (1979), as amended by ch. 79-587, 1979 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.
2608 (West).
46. "The provisions of chapter 933, relating to probable cause for the issuance of search
warrants, shall "not apply to this section." FLA. STAT. § 570.15(1)(b) (1979), as amended by
ch. 79-587, 1979 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 2608 (West).
47. Id. (emphasis added).
48. SENATE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, OVERSIGHT STUDY OF THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT
OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES 53 (Nov. 10, 1978) [hereinafter cited as OVERSIGHT
STUDY]. In 1959 the division was given expanded authority to inspect and regulate all fruits,
vegetables, and peanuts. Id.
49. STATE OF FLORIDA, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, OFFICE OF PLANNING AND
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The statutory purpose of the Division is "the administration and
enforcement of the Feed, Fertilizer, Pesticide, Seed, Certified Seed,
Food and Poultry and Egg Chapters of the Florida Statutes."'50 Its
specific responsibilities deal exclusively with agricultural, horticul-
tural, and livestock products.'
Currently, sixteen agricultural inspection stations dot north
Florida highways.52 The duties of Florida's 199 road guard inspec-
tors and supervisors are limited to three areas: "(1) checking all
documents accompanying shipments to ensure that they are au-
thentic and in proper order, (2) visually inspecting as many loads
as possible to ensure that they correspond with the documents
., and (3) recording statistical data."'53
During 1978-79, Florida's agricultural inspectors intercepted
more than twenty tons of marijuana, often at great personal risk."
Since 1973, three inspectors have been abducted by alleged mari-
juana smugglers, and two have been overpowered long enough for
the suspects to escape. One of the abductees, Austin Gay, was mur-
dered by his kidnappers in April, 1979. 5" Most of these incidents
BUDGETING, PROGRAM EVALUATION OFFICE, ROAD GUARD AGRICULTURAL INSPECTION STATION/
CONTRABAND STUDY 7 (March 1980) [hereinafter cited as CONTRABAND STUDY].
50. OVERSIGHT STUDY, supra note 48, at 35.
51. Florida law requires the Department of Agriculture to inspect fresh citrus fruit, cit-
rus juice and concentrate, tomatoes, limes and avocadoes, livestock, plants, feed, bees and
bee equipment, poultry and eggs, dairy products, fertilizer, and pesticides. CONTRABAND
STUDY, supra note 49, at 7. See generally FLA. STAT. Ch. 487 (1979), (Florida Pesticide Law);
FLA. STAT. Ch. 500 (1979), (Florida Foods, Drugs and Cosmetics Law (relating to food prod-
ucts)); FLA. STAT. Ch. 575 (1979), (Certification Seed Law); FLA. STAT. ch. 576 (1979), (Agri-
culture Fertilizers); FLA. STAT. ch. 578 (1979), (Florida Seed Law); FLA. STAT. ch. 580 (1979),
(Florida Commercial Feed Law); and FLA. STAT. ch. 583 (1979), (Classification and Sale of
Eggs, Poultry, Etc.).
52. The stations are located at Fanning Springs on U.S. 19-98; Rock Bluff on State Road
340; Branford on U.S. 27-129; Luraville on Highway 51; Dowling Park on State Road 250;
Interstate 10, eleven miles west of Live Oak; Ellaville on U.S. 90; Suwannee Springs on U.S.
129; Interstate 75, six miles south of the U.S. 129 intersection; White Springs on U.S. 41;
Lake City on U.S. 441; Baxter on State Road 127; McClenny on State Road 121; Hilliard on
U.S. 1; Yulee on U.S. 17; and Interstate 95, one mile south of the Florida-Georgia state line.
CONTRABAND STUDY, supra note 49, at 10.
53. Id. at 11. Actual product inspections are performed at the point of origin by inspec-
tors specially trained for product inspection. Id.
54. Id. at 15.
55. Id. at 1, 17. In November, 1977, Inspector Richard Brown was found handcuffed to a
tree after being abducted at gunpoint from his U.S. 90 inspection station. In March, 1979,
Inspector Leonard Pease was overpowered during a highway stop on 1-75 and was found
eight hours later handcuffed inside a church. Inspectors J.W. Davis and R.M. Shope have
both encountered marijuana smugglers who disarmed them and forced them to lie face down
until the smugglers could escape. Id. at 17. Inspector Austin Gay was abducted in April,
1979, and later found murdered. Id. at 1.
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occurred when vehicles failed to stop at a station and subsequently
were pursued and stopped on the highway by an inspector.""
The element of danger involved in an encounter with persons
transporting cannabis is considerably greater than that encoun-
tered with smugglers of other illegal goods for two reasons. Florida
law imposes long prison terms and substantial fines for possession
of marijuana;57 and tremendous profits can be realized from the
sale of a cargo of cannabis which successfully reaches its destina-
tion.58 From July 1, 1973, to June 30, 1979, Florida road guard in-
spectors intercepted 811 vehicles carrying contraband; 145 of them,
or eighteen percent, were transporting marijuana.'0 Thirty of those
145 vehicles were found to contain less than 100 pounds of the ille-
gal substance; two of the vehicles, both semi-trailers, were loaded
with more than 10,000 pounds.60 The average marijuana trafficker
stopped by inspectors, however, was transporting 1,000 pounds of
cannabis, which has a street resale value of approximately $400,000
56. The details of Gay's abduction are unknown. Of the other four incidents, only one
inspector was actually kidnapped from the inspection station. The other three inspectors
had pursued vehicles and were in the process of either inspecting the vehicles or escorting
them back to the station when the incidents occurred. Id. at 17.
57. See statutes cited at note 40 supra.
58. The United States General Accounting Office estimates that an ounce of marijuana
sells for approximately $35 on the street. Tii POLMCS OF DRUGS, supra note 42, at 120 n.4.
According to the GAO, marijuana consumption in the United States is between
60,000 and 91,000 pounds a day, or 11,000 to 16,000 tons a year. If federal claims
that there are 16 million regular users of marijuana in the United States are cor-
rect, the GAO estimate would indicate an average per capita daily consumption of
from .06 to .09 ounces. The amount appears small-less than 3 ounces a month
per user-but the aggregate cost is huge: from $13 billion to $21 billion a year at
street-level prices.
Id. at 120 (footnote omitted).
The figures on marijuana consumption used by the Office of Planning and Budget, Execu-
tive Office of the Governor are considerably higher:
According to a recent article in Parade Magazine, 50 million Americans last year
smoked 35,000 tons of marijuana. Florida Department of Law Enforcement esti-
mates indicate that 70 percent of this amount comes into South Florida from
Columbia for distribution to markets all over the United States.
CONTRABAND STUDY, supra note 49, at 14.
It is further estimated that marijuana wholesalers realize a profit of approximately
$160,000 on each 1,000-pound load of cannabis, or up to forty percent of the street value. Id.
at 15.
59. CONTRABAND STUDY, supra note 49, at 12. Other types of contraband intercepted by
road guard inspectors during the period from July 1, 1973, to June 30, 1979, included un-
taxed cigarettes (37% of total contraband seized), untaxed beverages (27%), and illegal
aliens (18%). Id. at 13.
60. Id. at 16. One semi-trailer was carrying 32,810 pounds of cannabis, which has an
estimated street value of more than $13 million; the other contained 24,920 pounds, with an
estimated street value of nearly $10 million. Id. at 15.
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and a profit margin of forty percent, or $160,000.1
Since 1967, section 570.15 has been continually revised, ostensi-
bly to protect inspectors from risky encounters with smugglers and
to grant them greater authority with which to conduct vehicular
inspections." During the same period, marijuana trafficking has in-
creased significantly in Florida, as has the state's resolve to elimi-
nate, or at least reduce, the problem. s The latest revision of sec-
61. Id. at 15. Sixty-seven percent of the vehicles found to be transporting marijuana
were pickup trucks and vans. Id. at 12.
Some feel that it is only the "amateur smuggler" who does not have enough funds
to purchase large quantities of marijuana in South Florida, or acquire an expen-
sive motor home [which would not be subject to agricultural inspection], that is
attempting to transport marijuana in vehicles that are subect to inspection if pur-
sued and stopped.
Id. at 16.
62. Id. at 9. In 1967, inspection stations were furnished with state pursuit vehicles and
employees were issued uniforms. Id. In 1975, inspectors were authorized by statute to wear
firearms after completing an abbreviated police standards training program, which consisted
of 160 hours of curriculum. The normal training requirement is 320 hours of study under
the Police Standards Training Commission. Id. at 39. A plan to ensure that all inspectors
receive the maximum amount of police standards training is currently being implemented
by the Department of Agriculture and is scheduled for completion by May 1, 1981. Thirty
employees, however, are ineligible to enroll in the training program due to disability or lack
of a high school diploma. Id. at 41.
When first enacted in 1959, § 570.15, permitted an inspector to apply for a search warrant
if he was refused access "to all places of business, factories, farm buildings, carriages, rail-
road cars, motor vehicles and vessels" used in agricultural pursuits. Ch. 59-54, § 1, 1959 Fla.
Laws 74. Chapter 75-215, § 1, 1975 Fla. Laws 493, changed the all-inclusive "motor vehicles"
to "trucks, motor vehicles other than private passenger automobiles with no trailer in tow or
any vehicles bearing an RV license tag, truck and motor vehicle trailers." It also authorized
inspectors and other personnel to conduct warrantless searches "pursuant to s. 933.19" and
created § 570.15(2), which made failure to stop for inspection a second degree misdemeanor.
For text of FLA. STAT. § 570.15(2) (1979), see note 1 supra.
Chapter 78-180, § 1, 1978 Fla. Laws 580, redefined which vehicles are subject to agricul-
tural inspections: "Motor vehicles, except private passenger automobiles with no trailer in
tow, travel trailers, camping trailers, and motor homes ... "
Chapter 79-371, § 1, 1979 Fla. Laws 1865 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 570.15(1)(b), (3),
(4) (1979), as amended by ch. 79-587, 1979 Fla. Seas. Law Serv. 2608 (West)), expanded the
inspectors' authority by permitting them to execute as well as apply for search warrants. It
also created § 570.15(3):
Every law enforcement officer is authorized to assist employees of the department
listed in subsection (1) in the enforcement of subsection (2). Such officer is au-
thorized to stop and detain any vehicle and its driver who has failed to comply
with subsection (2) until an employee of the department arrives to conduct the
inspection required by law. Such law enforcement officer or a road guard inspec-
tion special officer may require the driver to return with his vehicle to the road
guard inspection station where the driver failed to stop the vehicle for inspection.
Section 570.15(4) was also created by ch. 79-371. It immunizes persons "authorized to en-
force or assist in enforcement of the provisions of this section" from civil and criminal
liability.
63. See note 42 supra.
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tion 570.15, the statutory authorization for agricultural inspections,
is apparently an extension of that policy. It seems questionable,
however, that the amended statute will actually decrease the risks
road guard inspectors face when they encounter marijuana smug-
glers. To the contrary, past experience would indicate that grant-
ing inspectors broader discretion in conducting searches will pose
an even greater threat to their personal safety."' It is also highly
debatable whether strengthening the discretionary search powers
of road guard employees will significantly increase the amount of
marijuana confiscated. It is likely, however, that the use of this
new statutory power will result in fewer convictions for possession
and intent to sell marijuana because searches authorized by this
statute appear to violate both federal and state constitutional
guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures.6
The situation is made more complex by the fact that it touches
on several areas of law which have yet to be clearly defined by case
law: the application of fourth amendment safeguards to automo-
bile searches; 6 the purposes for which an administrative search
64. See notes 55-56 supra; see also CONTRABAND STUDY, supra note 49, at 36.
Florida is one of only three states which operate highway agricultural inspection stations.
Id. at 43. In Arizona and California, inspectors do not have authority to pursue vehicles.
They are required to notify the highway patrol when a vehicle fails to stop for inspection.
Id.
65. FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 12 states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, and against the unreasonable inter-
ception of private communications by any means, shall not be violated. No war-
rant shall be issued except upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particu-
larly describing the place or places to be searched, the person or persons, thing or
things to be seized, the communication to be intercepted, and the nature of evi-
dence to be obtained. Articles or information obtained in violation of this right
shall not be admissible in evidence.
For the text of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, see note 25 supra.
66. One commentator has noted, "For clarity and consistency, the law of the fourth
amendment is not the Supreme Court's most successful product." Amsterdam, supra note
23, at 349. That observation is particularly applicable to the Court's decisions relating to
automobile searches. In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), the Court established
the basis for the proposition that persons have a lesser expectation of privacy in
automobiles due to the mobility of the vehicle. Since then, the following cases have carved
out a sometimes confusing framework for applying fourth amendment guarantees to the
search and seizure of automobiles: A vehicle search not based on probable cause at the time
of arrest is also invalid if conducted after impoundment of the automobile, Dyke v. Imple-
ment Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968); the peculiar characteristics of an automobile validate
warrantless searches when probable cause exists, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970);
a warrant is required if the automobile is not likely to be removed, Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); the search of an automobile is far less intrusive than the search of
a person or residence, Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); a greater expectation of pri-
vacy exists in personal luggage found within an automobile than exists in the automobile
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warrant may be issued;67 and the public policy underlying the gov-
ernment's attempt to control the illegal use of marijuana.6 8 Viewed
in the narrow setting presented by Florida's agricultural inspection
program, it appears that section 570.15 is a constitutionally invalid
exercise of the state's police power.
Delaware v. Prouse,69 a recent automobile search and seizure
case, indicates the current approach used by the United States Su-
preme Court in determining the extent to which automobile
searches fall within the protection of the fourth amendment. In
Prouse, the Court held that discretionary spot checks of motorists'
licenses and car registrations for the purpose of ensuring highway
safety did not constitute a sufficiently legitimate governmental in-
terest to outweigh "the resulting intrusion on the privacy and se-
curity of the persons detained. '70 As in Pederson, marijuana was
discovered in the automobile during a routine stop. Unlike the
Florida case, however, the Delaware patrolman who stopped the
Prouse car did not conduct a search. The marijuana was in plain
view on the floor of the vehicle.71 Thus, the infringement on
itself, United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); a legitimate expectation of privacy by
automobile passengers must exist before evidence seized from the car can be suppressed,
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); discretionary spot checks of automobiles are unrea-
sonable intrusions on privacy expectations, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). See
also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (border checkpoint operations
valid because they constitute lesser intrusion upon expectations of privacy than do roving
patrols); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882 (1975) (roving border patrols in
search of illegal aliens and contraband require "reasonable suspicion" to search vehicles).
See generally Allen & Schaefer note 30 supra.
67. In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), the Supreme Court held that
regulatory health inspections require a less stringent standard of probable cause than do
searches conducted for criminal investigatory purposes. This lesser standard has also been
applied to regulatory inspections of commercial premises, See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S.
541 (1967). Probable cause is not required, however, for the regulatory inspection of prem-
ises connected with the liquor industry, because Congress has broad powers to regulate that
industry and has authorized such inspections by statute, Colonnade Catering Corp. v.
United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970). A similar exception to the probable cause standard has
been applied to the firearms industry, United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972). The
Court's most recent consideration of warrantless administrative searches occurred in Mar-
shall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), in which the Court held that inspections con-
ducted pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Health Act must meet the probable cause
standards of Camara. See generally Note, Administrative Searches and the Fourth
Amendment: An Alternative to the Warrant Requirement, 64 CORNELL L. Rav. 856 (1979).
68. "We must ask ourselves whether marijuana is such a menace to American society
that prohibiting it is worth breeding disrespect for the law. . . .The demand for drugs, not
the illicit supply, lies at the heart of America's drug problems." THE POLITICs OF DRUGs,
supra note 42, at 157.
69. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
70. Id. at 655.
71. Id. at 650.
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Proise's privacy was much less intrusive than that suffered by
Pederson. Even so, the Court held that, because the Delaware of-
ficer had no reason, i.e., no probable cause, to suspect any kind of
traffic violation or other illegal activity when he stopped the vehi-
cle, he could not legally seize the drugs as evidence of criminal ac-
tivity.7 2 The Court recognized the state's interest in promoting
highway safety, but found that other means could be used without
jeopardizing the privacy interests of motorists. 3 Writing for the
six-justice majority, Justice White construed the reasonableness
standard of the fourth amendment to require "at a minimum, that
the facts upon which an intrusion is based be capable of measure-
ment against 'an objective standard,' whether this be probable
cause or a less stringent test. '74
When the Prouse holding is applied to the Florida agricultural
inspection procedures, it becomes clear that the state may not jus-
tify the seizure of contraband when it occurs in the course of an
inspection for diseased or poor quality agricultural products unless
fourth amendment safeguards have been met. An application of
the Prouse balancing analysis to Pederson indicates that, while the
stopping of the defendant's truck was a valid exercise of the state's
police power, the subsequent intrusion, i.e., the search, was not.
The articulated governmental interest in granting road guard in-
spectors full access to certain vehicles is "to enforce laws, rules,
and regulations promulgated by the Department of Agriculture
and Consumer Services for regulating the movement of agricul-
tural, horticultural and livestock products. 7 As in Prouse, that
type of state regulatory interest does not outweigh the constitu-
tional right of an individual to be free from an unreasonable intru-
sion upon his or her privacy and security.
In 1976, the Florida Supreme Court held section 570.15 constitu-
tional in Stephenson v. Department of Agriculture, to the extent
that it requires certain vehicles to stop for inspection. Adopting
the district court of appeal's opinion as its own, the supreme court
affirmed that agricultural inspections are a valid exercise of the
state's police power and necessary for "disease control, fruit and
72. Id. at 661.
73. Id. at 658-661.
74. Id. at 654 (footnotes omitted).
75. CONTRABAND STUDY, supra note 49, at 9.
76. 342 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 1976). The court refused an apparel company's request for an
injunction to exempt its trucks from being required to stop at inspection stations since the
company's vehicles did not transport agricultural products. Id.
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vegetable grading and other similar matters."' 7 In the same opin-
ion, however, the appellate court qualified that power by stating,
"[I]f access is refused, the vehicle may not be searched without the
inspector obtaining a search warrant or without a legal basis for
search without a warrant pursuant to established law."'7' Thus, the
Florida court explicitly recognized that the state's interest in pro-
tecting the quality of its agricultural products does not outweigh
an individual's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
intrusions.
The complicating factor in Pederson and similar cases is that the
agricultural inspectors did not seize diseased fruits or vegetables,
but illegal drugs. The Pederson court implicitly recognized that
the inspector had no statutory authority to search vehicles specifi-
cally for contraband when it stated, "[Tihe provisions of Carroll
• . . are applicable . . . when searches and seizures are made by
the proper officers exercising police authority in the enforcement
of any law of the state relative to the unlawful transportation of
liquors, illegal drugs, or other contraband. ' '7 9 Nothing in chapter
570 empowers agricultural road guard inspectors to enforce any
law relative to transportation of illegal drugs. Nevertheless, since
1975, section 570.15 has authorized Road Guard Bureau employees
to conduct searches of specified vehicles with or without a war-
rant.80 As amended in 1979, the statute currently goes a step fur-
ther by eliminating the requirement that probable cause to believe
that a violation has occurred be present (1) prior to the issuance of
a search warrant,81 and (2) before a warrantless search prompted
by exigent circumstances may be conducted."' Florida case law,
specifically decisions of the First District Court of Appeal,8 indi-
cates that some road guard inspectors routinely exceeded their
statutory authority under the prior statute, which required that
probable cause exist before a valid search could be carried out.
They obtained warrants based on inadequate affidavits which
failed prima facie to establish sufficient probable cause;" they con-
77. Id. at 62 (quoting 329 So. 2d 373, 376 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976)).
78. 329 So. 2d at 376.
79. 373 So. 2d at 369 (emphasis added).
80. See ch. 75-215, § 1, 1975 Fla. Laws 493.
81. See Pederson v. State, 373 So. 2d at 369.
82. See Miller v. State, 368 So. 2d 943, 944 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
83. All sixteen agriculture inspection stations are located within the appellate jurisdic-
tion of the First District Court of Appeal. See FLA. STAT. § 35.02 (1979).
84. Pederson v. State, 373 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979); State v. Webb, 378
So. 2d 884 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
19801
540 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:523
ducted warrantless searches without probable cause85 and without
the consent of the vehicle's driver;86 and they sought to search ve-
hicles which were unlikely to be transporting agricultural, horticul-
tural, or livestock products.87
The First District Court of Appeal has reversed a number of
convictions for possession of large quantities of marijuana on the
constitutional basis that the contraband was illegally seized by
road guard inspectors and therefore was inadmissible as evidence
under the exclusionary rule."
85. Miller v. State, 368 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979). The court said: "The
provisions of Section 933.19 [see note 10 and accompanying text supra] are not applicable
as there was a complete absence of any probable cause to suspect that the motor vehicle
apprehended was carrying any contraband." Id. at 944. Cf. Flynn v. State, 374 So. 2d 1041,
1042 (Fla. 1st Dist; Ct. App. 1979) (the strong odor of marijuana and the presence of black
plastic garbage bags were sufficient probable cause to conduct warrantless search of truck);
Smith v. State, 333 So. 2d 91, 92 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (enroute to inspection station
at request of inspector who stopped van, appellants were observed throwing large bags of
marijuana from the rear of their vehicle).
86. The court has frequently drawn a distinction between free and voluntary consent,
Holec v. State, 376 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979), and acquiescence to apparent
authority, Luxenburg v. State, 384 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
In Powell v. State, 332 So. 2d 105, 107 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976), the court stated:
They [three inspection officers] convinced appellant that they had authority which
they did not have, and thereby coerced him to break the lock and open the trailer
pursuant to their demands. Such consent was certainly not voluntary. . . . To
condone a warrantless search under these circumstances would make a mockery of
the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. Officers
could at any time coerce consent through the bluff and subterfuge of informing
the detained person that they could obtain a search warrant when, as a matter of
fact, they could not.
Cf. Eden v. State, 370 So. 2d 826, 827 (Fla. lt Dist. Ct. App. 1979) ("[11n the absence of
any refusal by appellant, the inspector had the right of full access to appellant's van.").
87. During an on-site study conducted by the Office of Planning and Budgeting, Pro-
gram Evaluation Office, Executive Office of the Governor, it was found that 86% of the
vehicles which failed to stop at the ten inspection stations observed during a 24-hour period
were pickup trucks and vans. Of the vehicles found transporting marijuana, 88% were pick-
up trucks and vans. CONTRABND SUDY, supra note 49, at 19, 23. "Thus, when a road guard
inspector pursues a vehicle which has bypassed an inspection station, he is pursuing a vehi-
cle that is known to frequently be transporting marijuana." Id. at 23. The question which
must be asked is whether the inspector is likely to find agricultural, horticultural, or live-
stock products in these vehicles.
88. Although the number of convictions secured by the state under prior law is not avail-
able, at least nine convictions have been overturned by the First District Court of Appeal on
the basis of the exclusionary rule during 1979-80 alone. See Luxenburg v. State, 384 So. 2d
742 (Fla. 1st Diet. Ct. App. 1980); Byrd v. State, 380 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1980); State v. Webb, 378 So. 2d 884 (Fla. lot Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Nelson v. State, 376 So.
2d 459 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Pederson v. State, 373 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1979); Villari v. State, 372 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Seuss v. State, 370
So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Rose v. State, 369 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1979); Miller v. State, 368 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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Two of those cases illustrate the situation faced by the court in
applying both the reasonableness clause and the warrant clause of
the fourth amendment. In Villari v. State,89 the defendant ap-
pealed his conviction for possession and intent to sell 100 pounds
of marijuana which had been discovered in his pickup truck by ag-
ricultural inspector Leonard Pease. After shining a flashlight into
the back of Villari's truck,9" Pease attempted to enter the vehicle
but stopped when Villari asked, "'Don't you need a search warrant
to look at my personal belongings?' "91 The inspector pointed to
luggage which was set apart from the truck's blanket-covered cargo
and responded, "'I have no intention of looking in there.'", After
consulting with his supervisor by telephone, Inspector Pease re-
turned to Villari's truck and "lifted the blanket covering several
large bags. He then smelled the strong odor of marijuana," ar-
rested the defendant for failing to stop initially at the inspection
station, and called the sheriff.9
On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal held that Villari
had not freely consented to the search which actually uncovered
the cannabis." Since no exigent circumstances, such as voluntary
consent, existed, "further search necessitated the issuance of a
search warrant pursuant to § 570.15(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (1977)." '"
State v. Webb" involved a search which was conducted pursuant
to a warrant. The defendant bypassed the inspection station and
was stopped on the highway by an inspector. When she was unable
to open the back of the camper-topped pickup truck she was driv-
ing, Webb was read her Miranda rights. The inspector told her he
89. 372 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979). Villari failed to stop at the inspection
station and was stopped on the highway by Inspector Pease. Id. at 523.
90. The court held that this limited search was not illegal since Villari had willingly
opened the back of the truck at the inspector's request. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. FLA. STAT. § 570.151 (1979) grants agriculture inspectors only the power to arrest
persons for failing to stop for inspection, which is a violation of FLA. STAT. § 570.15(2)
(1979), and constitutes a second degree misdemeanor.
94. 372 So. 2d at 524. The court found that the state had not produced clear and con-
vincing evidence that Villari's consent was voluntarily given:
To accept the state's version would require that we interpret appellant's remarks
to mean that he *did not consent to the search of his suitcases, which in no way
incriminated him, but voluntarily consented to the search of the cargo consisting
of the marijuana which did incriminate him. We find this reasoning untenable
Id.
95. Id.
96. 378 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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smelled marijuana and asked for consent to conduct a search. She
refused. The inspector then escorted Webb and her truck to the
county jail, where he obtained and executed a search warrant. 7
The trial court granted a motion to suppress admission of the
marijuana discovered in the defendant's truck because the affidavit
made by the agricultural inspector in seeking the issuance of a
warrant failed to state sufficient probable cause for the search.98
The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's hold-
ing because "Inspector Pease had no probable cause to believe that
Ms. Webb's vehicle was carrying [agricultural] products and the
affidavit states none." 9
The Villari and Webb decisions are completely consistent with
United States Supreme Court case law construing the fourth
amendment. In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,100 the Court
cited Carroll v. United States to clarify its stand on the warrant-
less search of automobiles. "It is settled, of course, that a stop and
search of a moving automobile can be made without a war-
rant. . . . [B]ut the Carroll doctrine does not declare a field day
for the police in searching automobiles. Automobile or no automo-
bile, there must be probable cause for the search." 101 The Florida
Supreme Court held that warrantless searches "'are per se unrea-
sonable'" in Hornblower v. State,10' and that "the burden is upon
the State to demonstrate that the procurement of a warrant was
not feasible because 'the exigencies of the situation made that
course imperative.' "103 In the area of searches conducted pursuant
to a warrant, as was the case in Webb, the United States Supreme
Court has consistently demanded that the requirements of prob-
97. Id.
98. Id. In relevant part, the inspector's affidavit stated:
Because the affiant has, on prior occasions, found agricultural, horticultural or
livestock products in vehicles of this type, affiant pursued and stopped said vehi-
cle . . . .The driver was identified to the affiant as Judith A. Webb, and after
being advised that she had run the inspection station without stopping, Miss
Webb tried to open the rear of said vehicle with the only keys she had which fits
[sic] the lock. At this time, the affiant smelled, from the crack of the door, what he
believes is the odor of cannabis. From affiant's training and experience, affiant
has, on numerous prior occasions, smelled and recognized the smell as belonging
to cannabis. Because this vehicle may contain agricultural, horticultural or live-
stock products, affiant has not compleated [sic] his inspection at this time.
Id. at 885.
99. Id. (citations omitted).
100. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
101. Id. at 269 (footnotes and citations omitted).
102. 351 So. 2d 716, 717 (Fla. 1977) (citations omitted).
103. Id. (citations omitted).
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able cause and particularity be met before a valid warrant may
issue.
During 1979-80 alone, the First District Court of Appeal re-
versed at least nine convictions for possession of marijuana on the
basis that agricultural inspectors seized the contraband illegally."°'
No exigent circumstances existed in those cases to justify searches
made in violation of the reasonableness clause or the warrant
clause of the fourth amendment. 05
While section 570.15(1), Florida Statutes, merely ignores the rea-
sonableness and probable cause requirements of the fourth amend-
ment, section 570.15(2), Florida Statutes, explicitly violates the
very essence of the fourth amendment guarantee against unreason-
able searches. It makes it unlawful for a designated vehicle "to
pass any official road-guard inspection station without. . submit-
ting the vehicle for inspection."'" The Supreme Court has consist-
ently held nonconsensual, unreasonable searches to be unconstitu-
tional in its review of searches conducted by the United States
Border Patrol. The issue presented in those cases is the extent to
which an official who is seeking to enforce a statutory prohibition
against the illegal entry of aliens into the United States may stop
and search vehicles which may be carrying aliens.10 7 In Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States, the Patrol discovered marijuana during
the warrantless search of a car driven by a Mexican citizen who
was legally in the United States.0 8 The Court held that, since the
Patrol had no reason to believe that the defendant had crossed the
border or had committed an offense, and since the defendant had
not consented to the search, the search was constitutionally inva-
lid. 09 In Almeida-Sanchez, the government contended, just as the
state of Florida argued in Pederson, that the search was validated
by its administrative nature."0 The Court rejected this argument,
104. See note 88 supra.
105. For a discussion of how the Supreme Court has incorporated "the second clause
.into the first," see Note, supra note 67, at 858-60, in which the author rejects the notion
that the two clauses support the concept that warrantless searches are unconstitutional per
se.
106. FLA. STAT. § 570.15(2) (1979), as amended by ch. 79-587, 1979 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.
2608 (West). See notes 45-48, supra, and accompanying text.
107. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). See
Keller, Border Searches Revisited: The Constitutional Propriety of Fixed and Temporary
Checkpoint Searches, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 251, 255-58 (1975).
108. 413 U.S. at 267-68. See Keller, supra note 107, at 258-61.
109. Id. at 271-72.
110. Id. at 270; Pederson v. State, 373 So. 2d 367, 369 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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saying, "The search . .. was conducted in the unfettered discre-
tion of the members of the Border Patrol, who did not have a war-
rant, probable cause, or consent. The search thus embodied pre-
cisely the evil the Court saw in Camara when it insisted that the
'discretion of the official in the field' be circumscribed by obtaining
a warrant prior to the inspection." ''
Even though Almeida-Sanchez involved a roving patrol and
Florida agricultural inspectors are located at permanent stations,11'
the discretion accorded road guards to pursue vehicles which do
not stop at the stations is arguably analogous to the unfettered dis-
cretion which the Court disapproved in Almeida-Sanchez."s
Moreover, in a second border search case, United States v. Marti-
nez-Fuerte, the Court recognized the constitutional validity of
stopping automobiles at permanent checkpoints on the basis that
"checkpoint operations both appear to and actually involve less
discretionary enforcement activity.""4 The Court viewed such
stops as "only a brief detention during which '[a]ll that is required
of the vehicle's occupants is a response to a brief question or two
and possibly the production of a document evidencing a right to be
in the United States.' ""1
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's rejection of the adminis-
trative search theory in Almeida-Sanchez, Florida has statutorily
applied the identical rationale to agricultural inspections on the
basis that it requires a standard of probable cause less stringent
than that required for criminal searches." 6 This attempt to cir-
cumvent the result in Pederson is based on two faulty premises,
however. First, when the cargo which Road Guard employees seek
to inspect is contraband, the resulting search is criminal in nature
not regulatory. Second, the United States Supreme Court's hold-
ings on administrative searches have been directed at the protec-
tion of privacy interests, not the facilitation of regulatory inspec-
tions. "If the government intrudes on a person's property, the
privacy interest suffers whether the government's motivation is to
investigate violations of criminal laws or breaches of other statu-
111. 413 U.S. at 270 (footnotes and citations omitted).
112. Id. at 268. For the locations of Florida's sixteen inspection stations, see note 52 and
accompanying text supra.
113. 413 U.S. at 270.
114. 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976) (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 558 (citations omitted).
116. FLA. STAT. § 570.15(2) (1979), as amended by ch. 79-587, 1979 Fla. Seas. Law Serv.
2608 (West). See notes 43-47 and accompanying text supra.
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tory or regulatory standards.""11
In Frank v. Maryland,"' an early administrative search case, the
Supreme Court refused to prohibit warrantless regulatory searches
on the basis that the fourth amendment was explicitly drafted to
prevent the unreasonable seizure of evidence for use in criminal
prosecutions. It guarantees "the right to resist unauthorized entry
which has as its design the securing of information to fortify the
coercive power of the state against the individual, information
which may be used to effect a further deprivation of life or liberty
or property." 19 But the Frank holding which limited fourth
amendment protections to criminal prosecutions was overruled in
Camara v. Municipal Court."s0 In Camara, the Court extended the
basic warrant requirements of the fourth amendment to adminis-
trative searches of dwellings because citizens are entitled to know
whether such an inspection is lawful; the limits of the inspector's
power to search; and whether the inspector is acting within his
statutory authorization. 121 Rather than eroding the mandates of
the fourth amendment that searches be reasonable and based on
probable cause as applied to administrative searches, the Court ex-
tended that constitutional guarantee to non-criminal searches for
the first time.
Contrary to Florida Agriculture Commissioner Conner's appar-
ent belief that "administrative probable cause" constitutes a sig-
nificantly less stringent standard than "criminal probable
cause,""'1 the Supreme Court has required both reasonableness
and particularity for the procurement of an administrative search
warrant, whether or not the search might result in a criminal pros-
ecution." '8 Thus, a regulatory inspection may not be conducted at
117. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1978).
118. 359 U.S. 360, 365 (1959). In Frank, "The Court stressed that the probable cause
requirement should not be flexibly interpreted as that would result in a dilution of the re-
quirement." Note, Warrantless Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment Mar-
shall v. Barlow's, Inc., 8 CAP. UNIV. L. Rzv. 321, 325 (1978).
119. 359 U.S. at 365.
120. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
121. Id. at 532.
122. Letter from Doyle Connor to Bob Graham (August 24, 1979) (located in Office of
the Governor, the Capitol, Tallahassee, Fla.).
123. In Camara the Court stated:
In cases in which the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant to search be
obtained "probable cause" is the standard by which a particular decision to search
is tested against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness. To apply this stan-
dard, it is obviously necessary first to focus upon the governmental interest which
allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of
the private citizen. For example, in a criminal investigation, the police may under-
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the complete discretion of a government official; justification for
the intrusion is required.
The Supreme Court has considered the issue of regulatory in-
spections and their relationship to the fourth amendment in two
different factual settings. Camara involved a non-law enforcement
inspector and the search of a dwelling for health regulation pur-
poses.124 Prouse, on the other hand, dealt with a police officer who
detained a vehicle, which constitutes a seizure under the fourth
amendment, for safety regulation purposes.1 5 While Camara and
Prouse both involved an administrative activity subject to the con-
stitutional safeguards imposed by the fourth amendment, the fac-
tual elements of each case are easily distinguishable from one
another.
Elements of both Camara and Prouse are present in the Florida
agricultural inspection cases. The inspectors in both Camara and
Pederson were not law enforcement officers.126 The purpose of the
vehicular detentions and searches in both Prouse and Pederson
was to conduct a regulatory inspection. 27 The result of the Peder-
son search and seizure, as in Prouse, was the discovery and confis-
cation of marijuana.12 8 As in Camara, the court in Pederson held
that a warrant supported by probable cause must be obtained prior
to conducting an administrative search if the owner refuses to con-
sent to a warrantless search.12" Finally, as in Prouse, the Pederson
court held that it is illegal to search for and seize evidence of crim-
inal activity in the course of a regulatory inspection which does not
meet the reasonableness standard of the fourth amendment.180
Notwithstanding the differing factual elements present in
Camara, Prouse, and Pederson, the constitutional doctrine is the
same: Any search or seizure which is not reasonable and is not sup-
ported by probable cause is constitutionally invalid. Thus, the reli-
ance which Florida officials placed on the administrative search
take to recover specific stolen or contraband goods. But that public interest would
hardly justify a sweeping search of an entire city conducted in the hope that these
goods might be found. Consequently, a search for these goods, even with a war-
rant, is "reasonable" only when there is "probable cause" to believe that they will
be uncovered in a particular dwelling.
387 U.S. at 534-35.
124. 387 U.S. at 523.
125. 440 U.S. at 649, 653.
126. 387 U.S. at 525-26; 373 So. 2d at 368.
127. 440 U.S. at 662; 373 So. 2d at 368.
128. 373 So. 2d at 368.
129. Id. at 369.
130. Id.
theory as a basis for revising section 570.15 is completely unsup-
ported by constitutional case law. Chapter 79-587, Laws of Florida,
amended the statute which authorizes agricultural inspections to
allow inspectors full access to certain vehicles "which could be
used" in agriculture-related activities, thus giving road guard per-
sonnel virtually unlimited discretion in detaining those vehicles.
The only prerequisites for currently obtaining a search warrant
under section 570.15(1)(b) are that the inspector must think the
vehicle is subject to inspection under section 570.15(1)(a), that the
driver must have had reasonable notice to stop, and that the driver
must refuse to allow a search of his or her vehicle. 131 The "'objec-
tive standard,' whether this be probable cause or a less stringent
test," which the Supreme Court established as a minimum reason-
ableness standard in Prouse, 1 2 is conspicuously absent from the
warrant requirements of section 570.15(1)(b).
In summary, Supreme Court precedents construing the fourth
amendment afford no support for the proposition that Florida's ag-
ricultural inspectors may conduct unreasonable warrantless
searches, or searches based on warrants which lack probable cause
and particularity, ostensibly to protect the state's agricultural, hor-
ticultural, and livestock products. The state's legitimate interest in
ensuring the wholesomeness of its food products, absent extraordi-
nary circumstances, does not outweigh an individual's right to be
free from unreasonable government intrusions as guaranteed by
the fourth amendment. Nor does Florida's legitimate interest in
controlling the illegal transportation of marijuana along its high-
ways justify the violation of civil liberties, especially when the en-
forcers of the claimed state interest are not police officers but agri-
cultural inspectors untrained in dealing with criminals.3 3
Florida officials, concerned with voluminous drug smuggling traf-
fic, should reevaluate their current approach to stemming that
tide. If checkpoint stops along the state's highways are an effective
means of identifying and arresting marijuana smugglers, and it ap-
pears that they may be, then those stations ought to be periodi-
cally monitored by trained police officers. Agricultural inspectors
should be prohibited from pursuing vehicles which fail to stop, and
be required instead to notify the Florida Highway Patrol or local
131. FLA. STAT. § 570.15 (1979), as amended by ch. 79-587, 1979 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.
2608 (West).
132. 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (footnotes omitted).
133. For a review of the current police training requirements and status of agricultural
inspectors, see note 62 supra.
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sheriff's department of the incident.
Current Florida law essentially ignores an individual's right to
be free from unreasonable search and seizure. Whatever interest
the state seeks to promote through the exercise of its police power,
it may not pursue that goal at the expense of personal liberties. "In
times of unrest, this basic law [against search and seizure] . ..
may appear unrealistic. . . to some. But the values were those of
the authors of our fundamental constitutional concepts. . . . If
times have changed, . . . the changes have made the values served
by the Fourth Amendment more, not less, important." 8 '
MARGOT PEQUIGNOT
134. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971).
